N9159F - 1988 HUGHES 369D - Complete Aircraft History & Registry Information

Quick Facts & Current Owner

Current Owner: HOWE AVIATION LLC
Location: SURPRISE, Arizona
Registration Status: Active until 08-31-2032
Serial Number: 1090605D
Last Seen on Market: Never Listed
Last Seen Airborne: No Recent Activity
Last FAA Action Date: August 2025
Owned Since: August 2025

About the HUGHES 369D

The Hughes 369D, also known as the MD 500D, is a light utility helicopter of note in the general aviation sector. It traces its lineage back to the OH-6A Cayuse, a military helicopter developed in the 1960s by Hughes Helicopters (which later became part of McDonnell Douglas). The OH-6A was known for its versatility, ruggedness, and exceptional performance in various missions, particularly during the Vietnam War. Building on the success of the OH-6A, Hughes sought to create a civilian version that could serve a wide range of industries where agility and reliability were paramount. Thus, the Hughes 369 model line was born, with the 369D being one of its most prominent members. The Hughes 369D made its debut in the late 1970s and quickly gained a reputation as a workhorse in the light helicopter market. It featured a more powerful Allison 250-C20B turboshaft engine, which allowed for improved performance, higher speeds, and greater payload capacity compared to its predecessors. The helicopter's five-blade main rotor system further enhanced its smooth handling and flight stability. In terms of design, the 369D maintained the sleek, aerodynamic shape characteristic of Hughes helicopters, which contributed to its efficiency and agility. The aircraft was designed for a variety of applications including law enforcement, emergency medical services, agricultural operations, and executive transport. Its compact size and superior maneuverability made it particularly effective in urban environments and other areas where space was limited. Additionally, the 369D was lauded for its low operating costs and ease of maintenance, making it a popular choice among private owners and commercial operators alike. The Hughes 369D stands as a testament to innovative helicopter design, providing reliable service across multiple sectors for decades. Its success also paved the way for further developments in the Hughes/MD helicopter lines, ensuring its legacy in the annals of aviation history.

Performance Specifications

HUGHES HUGHES

Capacity

Max Seats 4

Max Take-Off Weight (P) 3005 lbs

Performance

Cruise 130 kts

Range 267 nm

Take-Off Run 0 ft (helicopter)

Landing Roll 0 ft (helicopter)

Take-Off Run (50 ft) 0 ft

Dimensions

Wing Span N/A ft N/A in (rotorcraft)

Length 30 ft 10 in

Height 9 ft 5 in

HUGHES 369D General Aviation Aircraft Make/Model

Flight History and Activity for N9159F

No flight activity has been observed for this aircraft since 2022.

This could indicate the aircraft is in storage, undergoing maintenance, or operating in areas without flight tracking coverage.

Maintenance and Safety Records

Safety Record Summary

5 accident/incident report(s) on file
1 service difficulty report(s) filed

Accident and Incident Reports

February 09, 2022 - BEL AIR, Maryland

Damage Level: Substantial
Description: WEATHER WAS CLEAR AND CALM. AIRCRAFT ENGINE SUFFERED MECHANICAL FAILURE, CAUSING LOSS OF POWER. PILOT AUTOROTATED AIRCRAFT TO VACANT FIELD. MAIN ROTOR BLADES SEVERED THE TAIL BOOM FROM THE REST OF THE AIRFRAME. PILOT'S STATEMENT INDICATED THAT: APPROXIMATELY 5 NM WNW OF KAPG AN ENGINE CHIP CAUTION ILLUMINATED. THE PILOT MADE A BRIEF ADVISORY RADIO CALL ON THE COMPANY FREQUENCY TO THE LEAD AIRCRAFT INDICATING THE NEED TO LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AS NO AUDIBLE ENGINE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS HAD CHANGED. VERY SHORTLY AFTER MAKING THE COMPANY ADVISORY RADIO CALL, THE PILOT REPORTED HEARING ENGINE NOISE CHANGE ABRUPTLY. A ?GRINDING? NOISE COULD NOW BE HEARD EMANATING FROM THE AFT SECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT. THIS ?GRINDING? NOISE WAS INITIALLY ACCOMPANIED BY THE SMELL OF ENGINE OIL, WHICH EVENTUALLY BECAME SMOKE IN THE AFT SECTION OF THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT. WITH THE PRESENCE OF SMOKE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INFLIGHT AIRCRAFT FIRE, THE PILOT INITIATED AN EMERGENCY DECENT-TO-LAND TO A SUITABLE LANDING AREA. DURING THE DECENT THE ENGINE NOISE AND SMOKE IN THE AFT SECTION OF THE CABIN INTENSIFIED AND BEGAN MOVING TO THE FORWARD SECTION OF THE COCKPIT. THE PILOT OPENED THE FORWARD AIR VENT, AND REPOSITIONED THE FORWARD DOOR MOUNTED VENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF SMOKE / OBSCURATION IN THE COCKPIT, TO NO AVAIL. NOW IN AN EMERGENCY DECENT, WITH ROTOR RPM BEING ONE OF THE PILOT'S PRIMARY CONCERNS, HE CONTINUED IN A NORMAL AUTOROTATIVE ANGLE OF DECENT TO HIS INTENDED POINT OF LANDING. AT APPROXIMATELY 75-50 FAT (AIL) THE PILOT INITIATED A FLARE TO SLOW THE AIRCRAFT AND PREPARE FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A LOSS OF ENGINE POWER. DESCENDING THROUGH THE FLARE ALTITUDE THE PILOT LEVELED THE AIRCRAFT AND PREPARED FOR LANDING, AT THE SAME MOMENT A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ENGINE POWER WAS OBSERVED INDICATING THAT THE ENGINE HAD FAILED. SIMULTANEOUSLY THE COCKPIT SMOKE INTENSIFIED TO THE POINT THAT THE PILOT LOST VISUAL REFERENCE WITH THE GROUND HE INITIATED ?PITCH? PULL TO SLOW THE RATE OF DECENT. THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED THE GROUND IN A GENERALLY LEVEL ATTITUDE AND DURING THE GROUND RUN THE FRONT PORTION OF THE KIDS (TOE) DUG INTO THE GROUND CAUSING THE AIRCRAFT TO PITCH (NOSE) DOWN, IN AN EFFORT TO MINIMIZE THE LIKELIHOOD OF ROLLING THE PILOT APPLIED AFT CYCLIC TO KEEP THE AIRCRAFT LEVEL. AFTER A FEW MOMENTS, THE PILOT ROLLED THE THROTTLE FROM ?FLY? TO ?CUT-OFF? AND AFTER THE BLADES STOPPED ROTATING, THE PILOT EXITED THE HELICOPTER. ENGINE TEARDOWN REVEALED 2 THINGS. 1. A PIECE OF DEBRIS FROM A FRACTURED AIR INTAKE AT THE COMBUSTION CHAMBER. AND 2. A SEPARATED RIGID OIL LINE AT A CONNECTOR. THE LINE THAT PULLED OUT FROM THE CONNECTOR NUT APPEARED TO HAVE AN INSUFICIENTLY FLARED END, ALLOWING THE LINE TO SEPARATE FROM THE CONNECTOR NUT, CAUSING AN OIL STARVATION CONDITION.

April 25, 2020 - PYLESVILLE, Maryland

Damage Level: Substantial
Description: AT APPROXIMATELY 12:40PM ON 4/25/20 THE AIRCRAFT WAS INVOLVED IN REPOSITIONING A HIGH TENSION POWER LINE VIA LONG LINE EXTERNAL LOAD AT APPROXIMATELY 150 FT AGL. THE PILOT REPORTED A LEFT YAW, ENGINE OUT ALARM, AND HEARING THE ENGINE WINDING DOWN THE PILOT ENTERED AN AUTOROTATION. THE PILOT WAS ABLE TO RELEASE THE BELLY BAND PORTION OF THE EXTERNAL LOAD SYSTEM, BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO RELEASE THE CARGO HOOK. THE LONG LINE WAS NOT LONG ENOUGH FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO FULLY REACH THE GROUND. WHEN THE LONG LINE BECAME TIGHT IT ROLLED THE AIRCRAFT ON ITS LEFT SIDE AND CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT. METAR KMTN 251654Z 15005KT 10SM SCT021 14/11 A3009 A ENGINE INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED BY NTSB, HAVERFIELD AVIATION, AND ROLLS ROYCE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT UNPORTING OF FUEL WAS THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF ENGINE SHUT DOWN LEADING TO THE ACCIDENT.

June 16, 1980 - SANTA BARBARA, California

Damage Level: Unknown
Description: PUBLIC COMPLAINT BECAUSE TWO HELICOPTORS LANDED ON HOTEL LAWN.

April 25, 2020 - Pylesville, Maryland

Damage Level: Substantial
Description: The commercial helicopter pilot was attempting, via a long line, to move a conductor wire while it remained in contact with the ground, which is classified as a Class C rotorcraft-load combination (RLC) operation. According to the pilot, while he maneuvered the helicopter about 150 ft above ground level, he pitched the helicopter nose up about 5° to 10°, with no lateral banking, for about 10 to 15 seconds. The engine then experienced a total loss of engine power. In the autorotation, which the pilot estimated to be about 4 to 5 seconds, the pilot was only able to release one of two mechanisms that secured the long line to the helicopter. As a result, just before touchdown, the long line became taut and caused the helicopter to roll over onto its left side. The tailboom, main rotor, and tail rotor sustained substantial damage, and the pilot was uninjured. Postaccident examination of the helicopter found 146 lbs of fuel onboard. The pilot later reported that the helicopter had about 200 lbs of fuel (slightly less than half of a full load) when he began the flight about 1.5 hours before the accident. An engine test run found no evidence of mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation of the engine. The investigation identified four previous accident investigation reports that extensively documented loss of engine power due to fuel starvation on MD369 series helicopters while they were maneuvered in Class C RLC long line operations. In these past accidents, the remaining fuel on board ranged between 93 to 151 lbs. The investigations of these accidents found varying levels of pitch up and/or lateral banking (common maneuvers during Class C RLC operations) could interrupt normal fuel flow to the engine (that is, unport) at fuel levels well above the standard fuel minimums required for visual flight rules operation. Based on information provided by the helicopter manufacturer, with 146 lbs of fuel onboard, a 28.5° positive pitch attitude, with no lateral banking, could unport the fuel supply to the engine in static conditions. Therefore, in dynamic conditions, such as maneuvering, unporting could occur at lower pitch attitudes. The operator’s operating limitations at the time of the accident stated that for any Class C RLC operation, the flight must begin with a full fuel load and last no more than 1 hour and explains the policy by citing the risk of uncovering the fuel port due to lateral banking during these operations. The accident pilot believed that, similar to the operation he had completed earlier in the flight, moving the conductor wire was a Class B operation because it would not require any lateral banking of the helicopter. Because the pilot misconstrued the RLC class of operation he was performing, he erroneously believed that he only needed a minimum of 100 lbs of fuel at landing, which is the fuel minimum he selected on the operator’s job hazard analysis form before beginning the accident flight; the form contained no references to RLC classes. As a result of the accident, the operator updated its minimum fuel policies on its job hazard analysis form and in its RLC flight manual. The policies now provide specific references to Class B and C long line operations and detailed examples to help pilots’ understanding of which fuel minimums apply for specific operations. Thus, without evidence of malfunctions that would preclude the engine from producing or maintaining power and given the occurrence of fuel starvation during other Class C RLC long line operations with similar levels of fuel onboard, it is likely that the accident helicopter's maneuvering and nose-up attitude during the pilot’s attempt to move the conductor wire led to unporting of the remaining fuel, which resulted in fuel starvation and the loss of engine power. Additionally, it is possible that the pilot could have successfully landed the helicopter following the loss of engine power had the long line been released. The pilot had to pull two separate release mechanisms to detach the long line because the helicopter was previously configured for human external cargo (HEC) long line operations, although the specific operation being performed when the accident occurred did not involve HEC and redundancy to secure the long line was not needed (HEC operations were being performed earlier in the flight). As a result, the pilot did not have sufficient time to activate both release mechanisms, and the helicopter was substantially damaged during the attempted landing.

February 09, 2022 - Bel Air, Maryland

Damage Level: Substantial
Description: The pilot reported that he had heard a whistling sound with the engine while conducting powerline operations and landed out of precaution. He examined the engine and consulted with maintenance personnel, but no mechanical anomalies were found. The helicopter was grounded for the workday; however, at the end of the day, a decision was made to try and return the helicopter back to its base of operations. During the flight, the engine chip light illuminated followed by the smell of engine oil and a grinding noise. The pilot attempted a precautionary landing to a field, but smoke filled the cabin, reducing his visibility while in the landing flare. The pilot attempted to slow the rate of descent and impacted the ground in a near-level attitude. During the ground run the front portion of the skids dug into the ground, causing the helicopter to pitch forward. The pilot applied aft cyclic to keep the helicopter level. During the landing sequence the main rotor blades struck the tail boom, which resulted in the horizontal and vertical stabilizers and the tail rotor assembly separating from the helicopter. Postaccident examination of airframe and engine revealed residual oil on the interior and exterior of the engine access doors and on the interior of the engine compartment. The oil supply line that feeds oil to the Nos. 6 and 7 bearings was fractured along with its support bracket. Numerous other components including the gearbox housing, N1 coupling, gas producer (GP) turbine support assembly (which included a sump nut, retaining ring and plate, the No. 8 oil supply jet, and a fractured shear pin), No. 8 bearing, No. 8 rotating seal, No. 8 stationary seal, and the outer combustion chamber, had also fractured and/or sustained high heat damage. Evidence of fretting damage was also observed on multiple components. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Materials Laboratory analyzed these components and determined that the engine most likely failed due to bearing failures in the turbine section resulting from the high-cycle fatigue fracture of the oil supply line that fed oil to the Nos. 6 and 7 bearings. The oil line failure led to rapid deterioration of the bearings from oil starvation, resulting in misalignment of rotating components and interference with stationary components within the engine, producing the grinding noise noted by the pilot. The oil line fracture was also likely associated with the smell of oil followed by the smoke in the cockpit reported by the pilot. Further examination of the engine revealed that the engine failure likely started with the No. 8 bearing stationary seal. The outside diameter of the seal was undersized, so it did not have the specified interference fit with the GP support hub. The improper fit likely led to insufficient support for the No. 8 bearing and excessive flexing of the No. 8 stationary seal cup wall. As a result, the stationary seal developed fatigue cracks and eventually fractured. The lack of interference fit with the No. 8 stationary seal likely affected the effectiveness of the seal between the stationary and rotating seals, which could have allowed oil to escape forward past the seal and into the gas path. The fracture of the No. 8 stationary seal reduced the support for the rotating turbine components at the No. 8 bearing, which likely led to increased vibrations in the engine. Fractures in the outer combustion chamber, oil line clamp, and gearbox case housing all had indications of high-cycle fatigue fracture from vibration loading. These failures likely resulted from excessive vibrations associated with the reduction in support for the turbine section rotating components. The fractured oil line support clamp failed followed by the oil supply line. According to overhaul records, the turbine section was last overhauled in July 2020, when the GP turbine wheels were replaced due to service time limits. A review of the engine manufacturer’s overhaul maintenance manual (OHM) revealed the condition of the No. 8 stationary seal should have been inspected; however, there was no indication in the overhaul records that the No. 8 stationary seal had been inspected, removed, or replaced. The turbine module was removed by the operator a few months after the overhaul due to a N2 lockup and sent to a repair facility. The repair facility ended up removing the GP support and sending the unit to another facility where the 4th stage wheel was replaced. According to the engine manufacturer, the repair facility should have been following the same OHM inspection criteria that included inspection of the No. 8 stationary seal. According to the repair facility, they had no record that the No. 8 stationary was repaired/replaced at the time the GP support/4th stage wheel was replaced.

Service Difficulty Reports

Nov 2010

Registration

Registered to HAVERFIELD INTERNATIONAL INC in GETTYSBURG, PA

⚠️

Jun 1980

Accident/Incident

Accident with unknown damage

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Frequently Asked Questions

Who owns N9159F?

N9159F is currently registered to HOWE AVIATION LLC in SURPRISE, Arizona.

What type of aircraft is N9159F?

N9159F is a 1988 HUGHES 369D with serial number 1090605D.

Has N9159F been in any accidents?

Yes, N9159F has 5 accident/incident report(s) on file with the FAA/NTSB.

N9159F - 1988 HUGHES 369D - Complete Aircraft History & Registry Information

Quick Facts & Current Owner

About the HUGHES 369D

Flight History and Activity for N9159F

Maintenance and Safety Records

Safety Record Summary

Accident and Incident Reports

February 09, 2022 - BEL AIR, Maryland

April 25, 2020 - PYLESVILLE, Maryland

June 16, 1980 - SANTA BARBARA, California

April 25, 2020 - Pylesville, Maryland

February 09, 2022 - Bel Air, Maryland

Service Difficulty Reports

February 01, 2012

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